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I. INTRODUCTION
In most countries, banks share their automated teller machines (hereafter ATM’s): a card-
holder of a bank can use an ATM of another bank and make a ‘foreign withdrawal’. This
transaction generates two types of monetary transfers. At the wholesale level, the card-
holder’s bank pays an interchange fee to the ATM-owning bank. It is a compensation for
the costs of deploying the ATM and providing the service. This interchange system exists in
most places where ATM’s are shared.1 At the retail level, the pricing of ATM usage varies
considerably across countries and periods. In the United Kingdom or France, banks do not
levy any usage fee. In Australia, consumers pay a ‘foreign fee’ to their bank when they
use an ATM of another bank. In the U.S.A., cardholders pay two separate fees per foreign
withdrawal: a foreign fee to their bank and a ‘surcharge’ to the ATM-owning bank.
There have been substantial debates about the pricing of ATM networks since the be-
ginning of the 90s. There are two main issues. At the wholesale level, banks choose the
level of the interchange fee jointly in most countries. Some economists have argued that this
level could be reflected in the ATM usage fees or the account fee so that banks may use the
collective setting of the interchange fee at the wholesale level to relax price competition at
the retail level (see the Cruickshank report [2000] for the U.K., Balto [2000] for the U.S.A.,
Donze & Dubec [2006] for France). Several attempts have been made to limit the possibility
of collusion: for example in Australia and South Africa, regulation authorities have studied
the possibility to replace the interchange system by a ‘direct charging regime’ in which each
bank charges a single ATM usage fee to non-customers using its ATM’s (see Reserve Bank
of Australia & the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2000]; Competition
Commission of South Africa [2007]).
At the retail level, consumers are reluctant to pay ATM usage fees. It is especially true in
the U.S.A., where generally cardholders have to pay a foreign fee and a surcharge for using
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an ATM not operated by their bank.2 This ‘double charge’ makes foreign withdrawals quite
expensive (around 3$ in 2006, see Hayashi, Sullivan, Weiner [2006]), and consumers’ associ-
ations have complained about surcharges, arguing that interchange fees are already charged
to compensate banks for processing foreign withdrawals. On the other hand, banks and in-
dependent ATM deployers claim that the introduction of surcharging from 1996 has allowed
them to deploy more ATM’s and thus has facilitated access to cash. Empirical evidence
shows that ATM deployment has been much faster from 1996.3 Nowadays, the U.S.A. and
Canada have much more ATM’s per inhabitant than countries in which surcharging is not
applied.4 In the U.S.A., banks’ profits have been affected since the lift of the surcharge bans
in 1996. Indeed, the larger number of ATM’s and rising surcharges have induced a sharp fall
in the number of transactions per machine, notably the foreign acquired transactions that
generate revenues in the form of surcharges and interchange fees.5 The revenues per ATM
have fallen and recent studies show that on average banks lose money on their ATM’s.6
In this paper we study how the ATM pricing scheme affects the ATM deployment, con-
sumers’ welfare and banks’ profits. We notably address the following questions: Do ATM
usage fees harm or enhance consumers’ welfare? Does the collective setting of the interchange
fee favor collusion? Should the interchange fee be abandoned in favor of direct charging as
proposed by the Australian Competition Commission?
To answer these questions, we develop a model where two horizontally differentiated
banks first choose the interchange fee jointly and then deploy ATM’s and compete for de-
positors non-cooperatively. We compare three regimes of retail ATM pricing. In all regimes,
consumers pay a fixed account fee to join a bank. Under regime one, cardholders can freely
access to all ATM’s of the shared network (ATM usage fees are nil). Under regime two,
cardholders pay a foreign fee to their bank per foreign withdrawal. Under regime three, they
pay a foreign fee to their bank and a surcharge to the ATM-owning bank.
Consumers need a fixed amount of cash in a shopping space, that can range from a
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concentrated to a sprawling area. For a given number of ATM’s, the average travel cost to
withdraw cash is higher in a wider shopping space and consequently consumers’ valuation
of an additional machine is higher. The parameter reflecting the dispersion of the shopping
space will play an important role in the comparison of consumers’ welfare across the different
regimes.
We find that the size of the shared network is sensitive to the pricing regime. Under
regime one, ATM usage is free and hence all ATM’s are identical for consumers. In this
case, banks deploy ATM’s not to attract new depositors but rather to generate interchange
revenues. Under regime two and three, foreign withdrawals are not free and the two networks
are differentiated by usage fees: consumers prefer to join a bank with a large ATM network
in order to make less foreign withdrawals. In this case, each bank can increase its deposit
market share by deploying more ATM’s. We show that for a given interchange fee, this
differentiation effect of ATM usage fees leads banks to deploy more ATM’s under regime
two than under regime one. In general the network is even larger under regime three:
surcharging increases the revenue per non-customer’s withdrawal above the interchange fee.
Consequently banks are even more eager to open ATM’s to attract foreign withdrawals.
Paradoxically, for a given interchange fee, consumers’ welfare is larger when they pay
foreign fees (regime two) than when ATM usage is free (regime one) while the opposite is
true for banks’ profits. As noted before, more ATM’s are deployed under regime two which
benefits consumers but increases deployment costs. Banks’ pricing strategy reinforces this
effect on surpluses and profits. Indeed, when ATM usage is free, cardholders make ‘many’
foreign withdrawals which generates a large gross surplus that banks can extract through
the account fee. With the unitary foreign fees, consumers adjust the demand for foreign
withdrawals downward and pay less to their bank.
Another striking result is that when banks set the interchange fee at the joint-profit
maximizing level, profits are highest under regime one and lowest under regime three. When
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surcharges are prohibited, equilibrium profits depend on the interchange fee, so that banks
can use the interchange fee as a collusive device. This possibility is especially profitable for
banks under regime one because they can generate and extract a large consumers’ surplus
as explained above. Regime three is the worst for banks because many ATM’s are deployed,
leading to high deployment costs. Besides, we show that the interchange fee does not affect
banks’ profits anymore and cannot be used as a collusive device. The model predicts that
under regime three, banks lose money on average on their ATM’s, which is consistent with
evidence presented earlier.
We also compare the consumers’ surpluses at the profit-maximizing interchange fees.
We show that banks can extract all consumer surplus under regime one. This is not the
case when usage fees are levied. As noted before, more ATM’s are deployed under regime
three than under regime two and consequently, consumers benefit from a better but more
expensive service. We show that consumers prefer regime three to regime two when the
parameter reflecting the dispersion of the shopping space is high enough. In this case,
accessing to a machine is more costly and consumers highly value each additional ATM:
they are ready to pay for the large ATM network of regime three. When the shopping space
is more concentrated, consumers are satisfied with the smaller but less expensive network of
regime two. The importance of travel costs in comparing consumers’ welfare is consistent
with empirical evidence. Working with different local markets in the U.S.A., Knittel and
Stango [2008] use the regime change of 1996 (from regime two to three) as a ‘before and after
experiment’ to study the impact of the ATM pricing on ATM deployment and consumers’
welfare. They find that ‘consumers in high travel cost counties experience substantially
higher welfare after 1996, while the net effect remains negative for consumers in low travel
cost counties’. Our paper is the first theoretical work justifying the importance of travel
costs in the welfare comparison.
At the regulatory level, we show that the ‘direct charging scheme’ where the interchange
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fee is suppressed and where customers pay a unique ATM usage fee to the ATM-owning bank
is equivalent to regime three. This comes from the neutrality of the interchange fee under
regime three. Direct charging hurts profits because banks deploy many ATM’s to generate
surcharge revenues. Still, consumers benefit from direct charging if the dispersion parameter
is high enough.
Our analysis highlights the interactions between the ‘withdrawal market’ and the deposit
market: in our model consumers’ choice of where to open an account is endogenous and
depends on the account fees, the number of ATM’s deployed by each bank and the ATM
usage fees. Empirical works dealing with the American ATM market have shown that these
three variables matter. Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick [2006] find that higher surcharges
give customers some incentives to switch accounts from smaller banks to larger banks in order
to avoid high usage fees. Ishii [2006] and Knittel and Stango [2008] find that when banks levy
usage fees, the relative size of banks’ ATM networks has a significant impact on consumers’
decisions where to bank. The two papers also show that ATM deployment increases with
surcharging, which is consistent with our theoretical results. Knittel and Stango [2009] find
that the surcharge ban removal in 1996 positively affected deposit account fees. Ishii [2006]
also notes that a move to compatibility through the elimination of surcharges would raise
average deposit interest rates. Our results also support the fact that price competition on
the deposit market is less intense under regime three than under regime two: surcharging
makes a gain in the deposit market share arise at the expense of surcharges revenues.
Our work is also related to an extensive theoretical literature on ATM pricing (see McAn-
drews [2003] for a survey). Donze and Dubec [2006] focus attention to regime one and show
the collusive role of the interchange fee. We extend our model by considering a more general
demand for withdrawals and new pricing regimes. Massoud and Bernhardt [2002] consider
a framework where there is no interchange fee and ATM deployment is exogenous. They
show that banks set high ATM usage fees for non-customers in order to raise the cost of
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foreign withdrawals and become more attractive. This indirect effect of surcharging on the
deposit market also exists in our framework under regime three. In a work closely related
to ours, Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller, Sandonis and Santamaria [2009] compare regimes two and
three. They set up a model where banks install ATM’s in malls isolated from each other.
Consumers visit any of the malls randomly. Travel costs play no role in the demand for
ATM services. Using numerical methods, the authors find that surcharging boosts ATM de-
ployment and increases the price consumers have to pay for ATM usage. They show that in
most cases, the effect on deployment outweighs the effect on prices so that consumer surplus
increases. We obtain close results but our framework permits to take into account the role
of travel costs when comparing welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II builds up the model. Section III studies
the regime without ATM usage fee (regime one). Sections IV and V examine the regimes
with foreign fees (regime two) and foreign fees plus surcharges (regime three). Section VI
compares welfare across regimes and studies the effect of suppressing the interchange fee.
Section VII concludes.
II. THE MODEL
We use the Hotelling framework. Two banks are located at the two ends of a linear product
space of length 1. Consumers of banking services are distributed uniformly along this product
space. Their number is normalized to one. Consumers do their shopping and withdraw
money in another space, which we refer to as the shopping space. The shopping space
consists of a fixed number of stores and can be more or less spread out. It is a shortcut to
take into account travel costs to reach cash in the analysis. We will return to this point later.
We assume that within the shopping space, consumers’ location is uniform at any time they
need cash. The total amount of cash withdrawn per cardholder is fixed.
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II(i). Banks
They provide two kinds of services: (i) basic banking services (deposit management, possibil-
ity to withdraw cash at the bank’s branch office,...) and (ii) access to a network of compatible
ATM’s. The marginal cost of providing the basic services is constant and denoted by cb. The
number of ATM’s deployed by bank i is ni and the total number of ATM’s is n = n1 + n2.
As the measure of consumers is one, n is a number of ATM’s per consumer and 1 is clearly
an upper bound for n. We assume that since consumers are uniformly distributed in the
shopping space when they need cash, each bank uniformly deploys its ATM’s. The cost
of deploying and operating an ATM is denoted by c.7 The marginal cost of processing a
withdrawal is independent from the affiliation of the cardholder and it is normalized to zero.
When a cardholder of bank i makes a withdrawal at an ATM of bank j, bank i pays an
interchange fee, a, to bank j.
Bank i sets an account fee pi for its cardholders. There are two possible ATM usage fees,
fi and si. Bank i charges its own cardholders a foreign fee fi for each withdrawal made at
an ATM of bank j (foreign withdrawal). Bank i charges cardholders of bank j a usage fee
si (surcharge) when they use one of its ATM’s. We assume that banks do not make their
cardholders pay for domestic withdrawals, as it is usually observed. We will consider three
pricing regimes. Under regime one, there is no ATM usage fees: fi = si = 0. Under regime
two, only surcharges are prohibited: si = 0. Under regime three, foreign fees and surcharges
are allowed.
II(ii). Consumers
Their reservation utility is equal to zero. To become a cardholder of bank i located at a
distance δi in the product space, a consumer must pay the account fee pi to the bank. In
this case, the consumer obtains a total surplus equal to:
(1) wi = vb − tδi + vi − pi.
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The first term vb is the fixed surplus from consuming basic services. The second term tδi is
a differentiation cost in the product space (where t > 0). Parameters vb, cb and t have the
following properties:
Assumption 1. (i) t is ‘sufficiently large’ and (ii) vb − cb ≥ 3t/2.
Assumption 1(i) is required for the second-order conditions of the profit maximization
to hold. Assumption 1(ii) guarantees that consumers want to join a bank even if there is
no ATM. To ensure the existence of equilibria, vb, cb and t must satisfy one extra condition
described later. The third term of expression (1), vi, corresponds to the variable net surplus
from consuming withdrawals. More precisely,
(2) vi = ui(ni, nj, q
d
i , q
f
i )− (fi + sj)qfi ,
where qdi (respectively q
f
i ) is the number of domestic (respectively foreign) withdrawals made
by a cardholder of bank i. To justify the shape of vi and the resulting demands for with-
drawals, we have in mind a framework a` la Allais [1947], Baumol [1952], Tobin [1956]:
consumers trade off the costs and the benefits of holding cash. The costs mainly consist of
the forgone interests. However holding cash permits to use ATM’s less frequently. This is a
benefit because withdrawing cash at an ATM requires walking to the machine and possibly
paying usage fees. Clearly, the average travel cost to reach a machine depends on the network
size and the dispersion of the shopping space. In appendix 1, we define a quadratic gross
surplus function ui(ni, nj, q
d
i , q
f
i ). This function is built to generate individual demands for
withdrawals in which the three key determinants are the number of ATM’s, the dispersion
parameter and the usage fees. For tractability, these demands are linear. Furthermore, the
network size effect and the price effect are separated. We have
(3) qdi (ni, nj, fi + sj) = α
ni
n
nγ + β′(fi + sj)
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and
(4) qfi (ni, nj, fi + sj) = α
nj
n
nγ − β(fi + sj),
with α > 0, β > β′ ≥ 0 and γ ∈ [0, 0.39].8
For given usage fees and ATM market shares (n1/n, n2/n), the demands for withdrawals
are increasing in n: a larger ATM network reduces the distance to reach a machine. Con-
sequently, benefits to hold cash decrease and consumers make more withdrawals. However
each extra machine reduces the distance less and less so that the number of withdrawals
increases slower than the number of ATM’s. Parameter α is a scale parameter. Parameter γ
reflects the spread of the shopping space. As n < 1, the term nγ is decreasing in γ. A small
γ describes a case where the shopping space is concentrated so that the average travel cost
to access cash is low. In this case, consumers make many withdrawals but do not attach a
high value to an additional ATM. When γ is high, the shopping space is spread out and it is
more costly to reach cash. Cardholders make fewer withdrawals and each additional ATM
is more valued.
For given usages fees and a given total network size, cardholders make more domestic
withdrawals and less foreign withdrawals when the ATM market share of bank i increases:
a higher ni/n increases the probability that the closest ATM belongs to bank i when the
consumer needs cash.
Let us consider the price effect: raising the usage fee by one euro increases the number
of domestic withdrawals by β′ and decreases the number of foreign withdrawals by β. There
is a substitution effect measured by the ratio β′/β < 1. Note that the linearity of demands
guarantees their finiteness when fees tend to zero. This property is necessary to compare
the three pricing regimes.
In order to obtain a network size lower than one under the different regimes, we need a
second assumption:
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Assumption 2. c >>
α2(3 + γ)
12(β − β′) .
II(iii). Competition and Profits
We deal with cases where the market is entirely covered. Let δ denote the distance between
bank 1 and the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing services from bank 1 or 2:
(5) v1 − tδ − p1 = v2 − t(1− δ)− p2.
Bank i’s market share of deposits is
(6) Di =
1
2
+
1
2t
(vi − vj − pi + pj).
Note that D1 +D2 = 1. The profit of bank i is
(7) pii = (pi − cb)Di + (a+ si)qfj (1−Di) + (fi − a)qfi Di − cni.
The term (pi − cb)Di is the net revenue from providing banking services. The term (a +
si)q
f
j (1 − Di) corresponds to revenues coming from foreign withdrawals made by bank j’s
cardholders. The term (fi − a)qfi Di corresponds to net revenues coming from foreign with-
drawals made by bank i’s cardholders. The term cni corresponds to the total cost of deploying
and operating ATM’s.
II(iv). Timing of the Game
In our model banks choose ATM deployment and pricing decisions simultaneously. We
think this is a reasonable assumption because in reality, banks can adjust their networks
quite easily without incurring important sunk costs: ATM’s can be installed at reasonable
costs ‘through the wall” or inside existing retail establishments. They also can be resold.
The timing of the game is the following:
- Stage one: banks choose the interchange fee a jointly.
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- Stage two: banks choose the number of ATM’s they deploy, n1 and n2, and the fees,
p1, f1,s1 and p2, f2, s2, simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
- Stage three: each consumer chooses the bank that provides him with the highest
positive surplus.
- Stage four: consumers make withdrawals in the shopping space.
II(v). Resolution
We look for the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the model for a given interchange fee. The
four first-order conditions of the complete maximization problem are
(8)

∂pii
∂ni
= 0⇐⇒ p˜i∂Di
∂ni
+ (fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂ni
Di + (a+ si)
∂qfj
∂ni
(1−Di)− c = 0 (i)
∂pii
∂pi
= 0⇐⇒ p˜i∂Di
∂pi
+Di = 0 (ii)
∂pii
∂fi
= 0⇐⇒ p˜i∂Di
∂fi
+ (fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂fi
Di + q
f
i Di = 0 (iii)
∂pii
∂si
= 0⇐⇒ p˜i∂Di
∂si
+
(
(a+ si)
∂qfj
∂si
+ qfj
)
(1−Di) = 0 (iv)
with p˜i =
(
pi − cb − (a− fi)qfi − (a+ si)qfj
)
.
In each expression, the variation of the relevant decision variable has two effects on pii:
one through the demand for deposits faced by bank i and the other through the demands
for withdrawals. The term p˜i corresponds to the net revenue per additional depositor. We
now detail the effects more precisely for each regime.
III. REGIME ONE: ATM USAGE FEES ARE PROHIBITED
We take f1 = f2 = s1 = s2 = 0: the account fee is the only tool available to banks to
charge consumers. As withdrawals are free, cardholders consider all ATM’s as equivalent
and withdraw cash regardless of the ATM owner. We first derive the symmetric Nash
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equilibrium for a given interchange fee and then study how profits are affected when the
interchange fee is modified.
III(i). The Equilibrium for a Given Interchange Fee
To generate a network size smaller than one, we consider a given a smaller than 2c/α. We
characterize the Nash equilibrium {n∗1(a), p∗1(a), n∗2(a), p∗2(a)}. Only conditions (8)(i) and
(8)(ii) are relevant. It is convenient to start with the determination of the account fee. As
all ATM’s are equivalent for cardholders, cardholders obtain the same net variable surplus
from consuming withdrawals whatever their home bank is: v1 = v2 for any n1 and n2. Hence
we have
(9) Di =
1
2
+
1
2t
(pj − pi).
Using (8)(ii) and the symmetric condition on bank j, we get
(10) p∗i (a) = t+ cb + aq
f∗
i (a) + aq
f∗
j (a).
The equilibrium account fee is the sum of the differentiation parameter plus the total
marginal cost for bank i of accepting a cardholder. This total marginal cost is composed of
three parts: cb is a marginal cost of basic services. The term aq
f
i corresponds to the inter-
change fees that bank i will have to pay for the qfi foreign withdrawals of this cardholder.
The term aqfj can be interpreted as an opportunity cost: if the cardholder chose to become
a cardholder of bank j, he would make aqfj foreign withdrawals at bank i’s ATM’s and bank
i would receive aqfj . Hence, by accepting the customer, bank 1 loses aq
f
j , which appears in
the equilibrium account fee.
Let us consider the deployment problem by rewriting expression (8)(i) as
(11)
t
δDi
δni
+ a
∂qfj
∂ni
(1−Di) + (−a)
(
∂qfi
∂ni
)
Di = c.
(A1) (B1) (C1)
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The three terms of the LHS of expression (11) correspond to the three effects of deploying
an additional ATM on bank i’s profit:
• Term (A1). As there is no ATM usage fee, the extra ATM yields the same benefit to
all consumers: bank i does not attract new depositors: ∂Di/∂ni = 0.
• Term (B1). The cardholders of bank j make more foreign withdrawals (∂qfj /∂ni > 0).
Consequently bank i receives more interchange fees.
• Term (C1). The cardholders of bank i make less foreign withdrawals (∂qfi /∂ni < 0)
and bank i pays less interchange fees to bank j.
Hence under regime one, a bank does not deploy ATM’s to attract new depositors,
but rather to process the withdrawals made by its competitor’s cardholders and to limit
the foreign withdrawals made by its own cardholders. Associating condition (11) with the
symmetric condition on bank j yields the total network size as a function of a:
(12) n∗(a) =
(αa
2c
) 1
1−γ
.
The total ATM network size is increasing in a: a higher interchange fee increases each bank’s
incentives to open ATM’s in order to attract withdrawals from its own depositors and from
non-customers. As we have assumed that a < 2c/α, the network size is decreasing in γ: a
wider shopping space means that cardholders incur a higher average travel cost to reach an
ATM so that they make less withdrawals (for any given network size). Consequently banks’
competition to process withdrawals is less intense and the equilibrium network size is smaller.
At equilibrium the two banks deploy the same number of ATM’s: n∗1(a) = n
∗
2(a) = n
∗(a)/2.
From expressions (3) and (4) we have qd∗1 (a) = q
f∗
1 (a) = q
d∗
2 (a) = q
f∗
2 (a) = αn
∗γ(a)/2.
Interestingly, the total profit can be rewritten as
(13) pi∗i (a) =
t
2
+ aqf∗j (a)− c
n∗(a)
2
.
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At equilibrium, the interchange outflows per bank i’s cardholder, aqfi , are entirely recouped
through the account fee pi. Consequently aq
f
i does not appear in the profit expression.
For the equilibrium to exist, we must verify two extra conditions:
(i) For the market to be covered, the surplus of the consumer who is indifferent between
the two banks cannot be negative:
(14) vb − t
2
+ ui
(
n∗i (a), n
∗
j(a), q
d∗
i (a), q
f∗
i (a)
)
− p∗i (a) ≥ 0.
In appendix 2, we show that the previous condition is verified for all a smaller than a∗,
where a∗ is the unique positive interchange fee verifying condition (14) with equality. The
interchange fee a∗ permits to extract all the surplus of the indifferent consumer and it appears
in figure 1. It is not possible to characterize a∗ explicitly. However, we will be able to compare
the profits in the different regimes.
[Insert figure 1 approximatively here]
(ii) The second-order conditions must hold. We show that it is indeed the case if vb − cb
is ‘not too large’ in the sense defined precisely in appendix 3.
III.(ii) The Effect of the Interchange Fee on Equilibrium Profits
For any a ≤ a∗, the equilibrium profit of a bank is (dropping subscript i),
(15) pi∗(a) =
t
2
+
( αa
22−γcγ
) 1
1−γ
.
Proposition 1. Under regime one, equilibrium profits are monotonically increasing in a on
[0, a∗]. By setting a = a∗ banks extract all the surplus of the indifferent consumer.
To understand proposition 1, note that raising the interchange fee has two opposite effects
on profits (see expression (13)): first, there is a more intense competition to attract both
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domestic and foreign withdrawals. Hence, banks deploy more ATM’s and the deployment
costs increase. Second, the revenues aqfj coming from the account fee and the interchange
inflows increase. The effect on revenues outweighs the effect on deployment costs so that
profits increase.
Proposition 1 shows that setting the interchange fee jointly allows banks to collude and
extract consumers’ surplus. As profits are monotonically increasing in a, collusion is only
limited by the participation constraint of the marginal consumer. There could exist a differ-
ent type of equilibrium for interchange fees above a∗ yielding higher equilibrium profits. In
this paper, we only consider equilibria of the type we have described.9
IV. REGIME TWO: SURCHARGES ARE PROHIBITED
We take s1 = s2 = 0. Each bank charges its cardholders the two-part tariff pi + fiq
f
i . We
first determine the equilibrium for a given a and then the profit-maximizing interchange fee.
IV(i). The Equilibrium for a Given Interchange Fee
We consider a given interchange fee smaller than 4c/α(3+γ). We characterize the symmetric
Nash equilibrium {n∗1ff (a), p∗1ff (a), n∗2ff (a), p∗2ff (a), f ∗1 , f ∗2}. It is convenient to start with the
determination of the foreign fee. In appendix 4, we show that at equilibrium, the foreign fee
set by bank i is equal to the interchange fee:
(16) f ∗i = a.
Doing so, bank i maximizes its cardholders’ surplus while recouping the cost of foreign
withdrawals. The bank uses the fixed account fee pi to recover a part of this surplus in a
manner compatible with the competitive intensity.
Let us determine the equilibrium account fee. Using expressions (8)(ii), (16) and the fact
that Di = 1/2 at the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain:
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(17) p∗i,ff (a) = t+ cb + aq
f∗
j,ff (a).
The interpretation of the equilibrium account fee under regime two is nearly the same as
under regime one except that the account fee only recoups the opportunity cost of accepting
an extra depositor, aqfj . The other part of the marginal cost, aq
f
i , is now recouped through
the foreign-fee revenues fiq
f
i .
Let us turn to the deployment problem of banks. Using (17), expression (8)(i) can be
rewritten as
(18)
t
δDi
δni
+ a
∂qfj
∂ni
(1−Di) + (fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂ni
Di = c.
(A2) (B2) (C2)
The LHS of expression (18) shows how deploying an extra ATM affects bank i’s revenue:
• We show in appendix 5 that at the symmetric equilibrium δDi/δni = (α/2t)anγ−1:
term (A2) is positive and consequently higher than term (A1) of expression (11). As
consumers pay for foreign withdrawals, they prefer to open an account in a bank with a
larger network in order to make less costly foreign withdrawals. Hence, the deployment
of an extra ATM by bank i makes this bank more attractive and increases its deposit
market share (δDi/δni > 0) and its revenues. In some sense, the existence of foreign
fees creates differentiation between the ATM networks of the two banks. For a given
interchange fee, this differentiation effect of foreign fees makes banks deploy more
ATM’s than under regime one.10
• Term (B2) is positive and equal to term (B1) of expression (11). As under regime one,
deploying an extra ATM increases the interchange inflows of bank i.
• Term (C2) is smaller than term (C1) of expression (11). This is the interchange
recovery effect of foreign fees: since the foreign fee is equal to the interchange fee,
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the foreign withdrawals made by bank i’s cardholders become costless for this bank.
Consequently limiting its cardholders’ foreign withdrawals is no more a reason for bank
i to deploy ATM’s. This interchange recovery effect of foreign fees makes banks deploy
fewer ATM’s than under regime one.
Hence under regime two, banks deploy ATM’s to attract new depositors and to generate
interchange inflows. Note that the differentiation effect and the interchange recovery effect
act in opposite directions on deployment. In appendix 5, we show using expressions (16) and
(18) that the total number of ATM’s deployed under regime two for a given interchange fee
is
(19) n∗ff (a) =
(
α(3 + γ)a
4c
) 1
1−γ
.
The number of ATM’s deployed under regime two is increasing in the interchange fee, de-
creasing in the deployment cost, and decreasing in γ. Comparing expressions (12) and
(19) shows that in our framework, banks deploy more ATM’s under regime two than under
regime one for a given interchange fee: the differentiation effect of foreign fees outweighs the
interchange recovery effect. From expressions (3), (4), and (16), we have
(20) qd∗1ff (a) = q
d∗
2ff (a) = αn
∗γ
ff (a)/2 + β
′a,
and
(21) qf∗1ff (a) = q
f∗
2ff (a) = αn
∗γ
ff (a)/2− βa.
The equilibrium profit can be written as
(22) pi∗i,ff (a) =
t
2
+ aqf∗j,ff (a)− c
n∗ff (a)
2
.
This expression is similar to expression (13) we obtained under regime one. However, the
interchange outflows per cardholder of bank i, aqfi , are now entirely recouped through the
18
foreign fee fi and no more through the account fee pi. Using expressions (19), (21) and (22)
and dropping subscript i, we can write the equilibrium profit as a function of a:
(23) pi∗ff (a) =
t
2
+
1− γ
8
(
3 + γ
4
) γ
1−γ
α
1
1−γ
a
1
1−γ
c
γ
1−γ
− βa2.
We verify the second-order conditions of maximization in appendix 6.
We compare network sizes, banks’ profits and consumers’ surpluses under regime one
and two for a given interchange fee. We can consider the surplus of the indifferent consumer
denoted by w˜(a). At the symmetric equilibrium: w˜(a) = vb − t2 + v(a) − p(a). Dropping
subscripts, we have:
Proposition 2. For any given interchange fee a ∈]0, a∗], switching from regime one to regime
two yields
(i) a larger network: n∗ff (a) > n
∗(a).
(ii) lower account fees: p∗ff (a) < p
∗(a).
(iii) lower profits for each bank: pi∗ff (a) < pi
∗(a).
(iv) a higher consumer surplus: w˜∗ff (a) > w˜
∗(a).
Proof : appendix 7.
As noted before, for a given interchange fee, banks deploy more ATM’s under regime
two because of the differentiation effect of foreign fees. The increase in deployment costs
outweighs the change in revenues so that banks’ profits are lower under regime two.11 Ac-
count fees are also smaller because under regime two banks recoup the interchange outflows
through the foreign fees, and not through the account fee.
Consumers are better off with foreign fees. There are two reasons: first, the network size
is larger and accessing to cash is easier; second, consumers prefer to pay for their foreign
withdrawals through the ATM usage fees of regime two rather than through the lump account
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fee of regime one: in the latter case, cardholders consume (and pay for) ‘too many’ foreign
withdrawals.
IV(ii). The Effect of the Interchange Fee on Equilibrium Profits
Contrary to regime one, pi∗ff (a) has a unique maximum, characterized by
(24) a∗ff =
(
α(3 + γ)γ
24−2γβ1−γcγ
) 1
1−2γ
.
The profit function pi∗ff (a) is increasing in a up to the point a
∗
ff and decreasing thereafter.
To understand why, let us consider the effect of increasing the interchange fee in expression
(22). In a first time, the profit follows the increase in revenue per foreign withdrawal, a,
and in a second time, the declining demand for foreign withdrawals and the ever-increasing
deployment costs make the profit fall. In appendix 8, we verify that when a = a∗ff , the
surplus w˜∗ff of the indifferent consumer is positive. We sum up the results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Under regime two, equilibrium profits are monotonically increasing in a on
[0, a∗ff ] and decreasing thereafter. When a = a
∗
ff , banks leave a positive surplus to the
indifferent consumer.
As under regime one, banks can collude by setting the interchange fee jointly. Never-
theless, their ability to extract consumers’ surplus by raising the interchange fee is reduced:
cardholders react to the resulting rise of the foreign fee by adjusting their demand for foreign
withdrawals downward. Hence, the profit-maximizing interchange fee a∗ff is smaller than the
interchange fee a∗ associated to regime one. This is proved formally in appendix 8.
The size of the network for the profit-maximizing interchange fee is
(25) n∗ff (a
∗
ff ) =
(
α2(3 + γ)
64βc
) 11−2γ
.
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Note that assumption 2 guarantees that n∗ff (a
∗
ff ) is lower than one. The associated individual
profit is
(26) pi∗ff (a
∗
ff ) =
t
2
+ 4
2γ−4
1−2γ (1− 2γ) (3 + γ) 2γ1−2γ α 21−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
.
We will compare the profits for the profit-maximizing interchange fees across the different
regimes subsequently.
V. REGIME THREE: THE CASE WITH FOREIGN FEES AND SURCHARGES
Under regime three, each bank i charges its own cardholders the two-part tariff pi+fiq
f
i and
charges non-customers the linear tariff siq
f
j .
V(i). The Equilibrium for a Given Interchange Fee
As in regime two, banks maximize their cardholders’ surplus by setting the foreign fee equal
to the marginal cost of a foreign withdrawal (f ∗i = a) and extract it back through the account
fee. This is proved in appendix 3. Using expression (8)(ii) and the fact that Di = 1/2 at
the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain the equilibrium account fee of bank i:
(27) p∗i,sur(a) = t+ cb + (a+ s
∗
i (a))q
f∗
j,sur(a).
The opportunity cost of accepting an additional cardholder must now take into account
the surcharges siq
f
j that this cardholder would pay to bank i if he had chosen bank j. As
under regime two, the interchange outflows per cardholder, aqfi , are recouped through the
foreign-fees revenues fiq
f
i and not through the account fee pi.
At the symmetric equilibrium, expression (8)(i) can be written as
(28)
t
δDi
δni
+ (a+ si)
∂qfj
∂ni
(1−Di) + (fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂ni
Di = c.
(A3) (B3) (C3)
This expression shows that the qualitative reasons to deploy ATM’s are the same as in
regime two. First each bank deploys ATM’s in order to increase its deposit market share:
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term (A3) is positive. We show in appendix 9 that at the symmetric equilibrium δDi/δni =
(α/2t)(a+ si)n
γ−1. Second, deployment permits to generate more interchange inflows: (B3)
is positive. As under regime two, the third term is nil at equilibrium. In fact expression (28)
is the same as expression (18), except that a is replaced by a + si. The surcharge adds to
the interchange fee and permits double marginalization: the revenue per foreign withdrawal
is higher. Consequently, surcharging boosts ATM deployment.
Let us now examine the factors determining the level of the surcharge. Using expression
(27), one can rewrite expression (8)(iv) as
(29) t
∂Di
∂si
+
(
(a+ si)
∂qfj
∂si
+ qfj
)
(1−Di) = 0.
The LHS of expression (29) measures the effect of a marginal increase of si on bank i’s profit:
• The first term of the LHS is positive and equal to 1
2
qfj (see appendix 10): raising si
increases the price per foreign withdrawal for the cardholders of bank j. This has a
negative effect on the surplus derived from joining bank j and bank i becomes more
attractive for depositors. Hence, a higher surcharge permits bank i to enlarge its
deposit market share and increase its profit. This effect is known in the literature as
the depositor-stealing motive for surcharging (see Massoud and Bernhardt [2002] or
McAndrews [2003]) and explains why banks choose surcharges above the level that
maximizes their ATM revenues considered as a stand-alone activity.
• Bank i has also to consider the effect of raising the surcharge on the revenue coming
from non-customers. This effect is measured by the second term of expression (29). A
higher surcharge yields higher revenues per foreign withdrawal but non-customers use
bank i’s machines less frequently.
Using the fact that f ∗i = a, expressions (28), (29) and symmetry, we obtain
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(30)

s∗1(a) = s
∗
2(a) = s
∗(a) = αn∗γ(a)/3β − a
n∗sur(a) =
(
α(3 + γ)(a+ s∗(a))
4c
) 1
1−γ .
The two previous equations show that there is a reinforcement effect between the surcharge
level and the network size: for a given level of a, double marginalization induces a bigger
ATM network than under regime two. Demands for foreign withdrawals shift upward and
banks can set higher surcharges. In turn the higher surcharges increase the double margin,
and so on. Solving the previous system we have
(31) n∗sur =
(
α2(3 + γ)
12βc
) 1
1−2γ
.
We verify the second-order conditions of maximization in appendix 11.
V(ii). The Neutrality of the Interchange Fee
When foreign fees and surcharges are permitted, the interchange fee affects neither the
equilibrium number of ATM’s, n∗sur, nor the account fee p
∗
sur, nor the total price per foreign
withdrawal, f ∗ + s∗ = αn∗γsur/3β. Banks’ profits are therefore independent from a:
(32) pi∗sur =
t
2
− 2 4γ−31−2γ 3 2γ−21−2γ (5 + 3γ) (3 + γ) 2γ1−2γ α 21−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
.
To understand the neutrality of the interchange fee, consider the situation where bank i
obtains interchange revenues equal to a + s∗i for each withdrawal made by a cardholder of
bank j, and bank j receives f ∗j −a for each foreign withdrawal made by its own cardholders.
Cardholders of bank j pay f ∗j +s
∗
i per foreign withdrawal. Suppose now that the interchange
fee is increased by ∆a. Banks can preserve the equilibrium payoffs and cardholders’ demands
are unchanged if bank i reduces s∗i by ∆a while bank j increases f
∗
j by ∆a. The total usage
fee paid by bank j’s cardholder is still equal to f ∗j + s
∗
i , the number of foreign withdrawals
and banks’ revenues are unchanged. Since the equilibrium network size and the total usage
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fee are unaffected by the interchange fee, consumers’ welfare is also independent from a. We
sum up the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. When foreign fees and surcharges are allowed, the interchange fee is neutral
in the following sense: (i) its level does not affect the equilibrium deployment of ATM’s, nor
banks’ equilibrium profits. (ii) its level does not affect consumers’ welfare.
The neutrality of the interchange fee under regime three is a general result that was first
explained intuitively by Salop [1990] and proved by Croft and Spencer [2004] in a framework
where ATM deployment is exogenous. The main consequence of proposition 4 is that under
regime three, the interchange fee cannot be a collusive tool for banks anymore. Interestingly,
bank i’s accounting net revenue per ATM is equal to
(a+ s∗i )q
f∗
j,sur(a)D
∗
j
n∗i,sur(a)
− c = −7 + 3γ
9 + 3γ
c,
which is negative. As noted before, this prediction is consistent with empirical observations
that in the U.S.A., ATM’s operated by banks lose money on average (see footnote 6).
VI. COMPARISON OF THE THREE PRICING REGIMES
In this section, we compare banks’ profits and consumers’ surplus across the three regimes
when banks choose the interchange fee to maximize their joint profits. We also study the
consequences of replacing the interchange system by a direct charging scheme.
VI(i). Comparison of Profits and Consumers’ Surplus
Under regime one, individual profits pi∗(a) are monotonically increasing in the interchange
fee up to a∗, where a∗ is defined by condition (14) verified with equality. Consequently,
to maximize their joint profits, banks choose the interchange fee a∗. Individual profits are
pi∗(a∗). Under regime two, banks choose a∗ff defined by (24). Each bank obtain pi
∗
ff (a
∗
ff )
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defined by (25). Under regime three the choice of the interchange fee is irrelevant and each
bank obtains pi∗sur defined by (32). We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Suppose that under each regime banks set the interchange fee at the level
that maximizes their joint profits, then
(i) the network is larger under regime one and regime three than under regime two:
n∗(a∗) > n∗ff (a
∗
ff ) and n
∗
sur > n
∗
ff (a
∗
ff );
(ii) account fees are higher under regime one and regime three than under regime two:
p∗(a∗) > p∗ff (a
∗
ff ) and p
∗
sur > p
∗
ff (a
∗
ff );
(iii) banks prefer regime one to regime two and regime two to regime three:
pi∗(a∗) > pi∗ff (a
∗
ff ) > pi
∗
sur;
(iv) there exists a value γ(β′/β) above which consumers prefer regime three to regime
two:
∀γ < γ(β′
β
), w˜∗ff (a
∗
ff ) > w˜
∗
sur > w˜
∗(a∗) = 0;
∀γ > γ(β′
β
), w˜∗sur > w˜
∗
ff (a
∗
ff ) > w˜
∗(a∗) = 0.
where γ(β′/β) = 1
2
(
1− ln 16
3
/ ln(
99+29β
′
β
8+16β
′
β
).
)
Proof : appendix 12.
The threshold γ(β′/β) is represented in figure 2.
[Insert figure 2 approximatively here]
When banks choose the profit-maximizing interchange fee, fewer ATM’s are deployed
under regime two than under regime one. The reason is that a∗ff is smaller than a
∗: under
regime two, foreign fees are equal to the interchange fee so that banks’ joint choice of the
interchange fee is constrained to keep sufficiently high demands for foreign withdrawals.
Under regime one, a∗ is less constrained as it comes from consumers’ participation condition.
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This difference between a∗ and a∗ff reinforces result (ii) of proposition 2: account fees are
smaller under regime two than under regime one.
More ATM’s are deployed under regime three than under regime two. This is because
the revenue per foreign withdrawal under regime two, a∗ff is lower than the revenue with
surcharges, a∗ff +s
∗(a∗ff ). The empirical work of Knittel and Stango [2008] supports the idea
that in the U.S.A., a surge in ATM deployment accompanied the shift to surcharging. Using
counterfactual experiments Ishii [2006] also notes that banks are predicted to respond to a
surcharge ban by reducing the number of their ATM’s.
Interestingly account fees are higher under regime three than under regime two. The
reader may be puzzled by this result since the interchange fee being neutral under regime
three, one could expect a more intense price competition on the deposit market. Neverthe-
less, switching from regime two to regime three increases the cost for banks of accepting
depositors (the forgone surcharge revenues) and consequently, price competition is relaxed.
This prediction is consistent with empirical evidence. Knittel and Stango [2009] study a
panel of banks competing in local markets across the United States from 1994 to 1999.
They show that deposit account prices are positively correlated with incompatibility, and
are roughly 20% higher after the advent of surcharging.
Despite the higher account fees, regime three is the worst for banks because the boost in
deployment induces very high deployment costs.
For a given substitution rate β′/β, consumers prefer regime three to regime two for
sufficiently high values of the dispersion parameter γ. In this case, ceteris paribus, travel
costs to withdraw cash are higher and consumers appreciate the large network of regime three
even if they have to pay higher account fees and higher ATM usage fees. When the shopping
space is more concentrated consumers prefer the smaller and less expensive network of regime
two. Knittel and Stango [2008] find that after the introduction of surcharging in 1996 in the
U.S.A., consumers’ welfare increased in high travel cost counties while it decreased in low
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travel cost counties.
Regime one is the most profitable for banks and the worst for consumers because the
collusive power of the interchange fee is only limited by the participation constraint of the
marginal consumer. By banning usage fees banks can maximize consumers’ gross surplus
and extract it back through the account fee. Under regime two, banks’ individual objectives
do not coincide with the industry objectives: at equilibrium banks independently set foreign
fees equal to the interchange fee to maximize their individual profits while it would be better
for them to agree on nil foreign fees and to increase the account fee.
VI(ii). Direct Charging
The ATM markets in Australia and South Africa work under a regime close to regime two.
Recently, the Australian and the South African regulation authorities have proposed to use
a ‘direct charging model’ whereby the interchange fee applicable to each foreign transaction
would be removed and ATM owners would be free to set their own fee for foreign ATM
transactions (see Reserve Bank of Australia & the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission [2000]; Competition Commission of South Africa [2007]). According to its
proponents, there are two main objectives of the reform. First, removing the interchange
system limits banks’ possibility to collude. The second objective is to favor price competition
on ATM fees between ATM deployers. The resulting price flexibility is to be opposed to the
stickiness of interchange fees. One can study the consequences of such a regulation scheme
in our model.
Proposition 6. The direct charging scheme is equivalent to regime three. When the shopping
space is concentrated, switching from regime two to direct charging diminishes both consumer
surplus and bank profits: total welfare decreases.
Proof : setting a = f1 = f2 = 0 in the system of equations (8) yields the solution characterized
by (31).
27
According to propositions 5 and 6, the welfare change of switching from regime two to
direct charging crucially depends on the dispersion parameter, and hence on travel costs to
reach cash. The quality of ATM service is enhanced but account fees and ATM usage fees
are higher. When the dispersion parameter is high, direct charging is good for consumers
but bad for banks.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a tractable model to study the effect of ATM pricing on welfare in which
the relationships between the deposit market and the withdrawal market are highlighted.
We have shown that increasing the number of usage fees make ATM networks more differen-
tiated which provide banks with more incentives to deploy ATM’s. The potential increase in
revenues from adding usage fees is not sufficient to cover the additional deployment costs and
the model predicts that banks’ profits diminish when one switches from regime one to two
and from regime two to three. Regime three is specially bad for banks since the neutrality
of the interchange fee is further added to the large ATM deployment.
From the regulator’s perspective, our analysis shows the importance of travel costs to
reach cash when deciding to ban surcharges or not: consumers prefer regime three (or direct
charging) to regime two only when travel costs to reach cash are high.
Our results are consistent with recent empirical works showing that in the U.S.A., the
advent of surcharging triggered a boost of ATM deployment, higher account fees, and a
positive change in consumer surplus in places where travel costs are high.
Several questions remain unanswered. First while regimes two and three are well docu-
mented empirically, there are fewer studies about regime one (an exception being the recent
paper by Ferrari [2008]). Notably, it would be interesting to study to what extent banks use
the collusive power of the interchange fee under regime one. Second, it would be worthwhile
to verify empirically the prediction that account fees are higher under regime one than under
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regime two. Third, it would be interesting to study how the existence of independent ATM
deployers affects the ATM market and welfare.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Surplus from Consuming Withdrawals
We assume that the variable gross surplus from consuming withdrawals takes the following
quadratic shape:
(33)
ui =
1
β2 − β′2
[
(αβ
ni
n
nγ + αβ′
nj
n
nγ)qdi −
β
2
(qdi )
2 + (αβ
nj
n
nγ + αβ′
ni
n
nγ)qfi −
β
2
(qfi )
2 − β′qdi qfi
]
The variable net surplus is vi = ui − (fi + sj)qfi . Writing ∂vi/∂qdi = 0 and ∂vi/∂qfi = 0 and
inverting the system yields the individual demands for withdrawals. Using expressions (3),
(4) and (33), we obtain the optimized expression of vi,
(34) vi =
α2
2(β2 − β′2)
[
βn2in
2γ−2 + βn2jn
2γ−2 + 2β′ninjn2γ−2
]
+
β
2
(fi+sj)
2−α(fi+sj)njnγ−1.
Appendix 2. Characterization of a∗
Under regime one, the two last terms of expression (34) are equal to zero. By setting
n∗i (a) = n
∗
j(a) = n
∗(a)/2 we obtain
(35) v1 = v2 =
α2n∗2γ(a)
4(β − β′) .
Condition (14) can be rewritten with equality under the following shape:
(36) vb +
α2n∗
2γ
(a)
4(β − β′) −
t
2
− p∗1(a) = 0,
or using expressions (10) and(12),
(37) vb − cb − 3t
2
+
αa
2γ
1−γ
(2c/α)
γ
1−γ
(
α
4(β − β′)(2c/α) γ1−γ
− a 1−2γ1−γ
)
= 0.
The LHS of expression (37) is the function represented in figure 1 and the equation has
a unique positive solution, a∗. In general, it is not possible to determine a∗ explicitly.
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However, by setting vb − cb − 3t/2 = 0, we obtain the minimum interchange fee for a given
set of parameters (α, β, β′, γ, c) that we denote by a∗min. We have
(38) a∗min =
(
α
22−γ(β − β′)1−γcγ
) 1
1−2γ
.
The associated network size is
(39) n∗(a∗min) =
(
α2
8(β − β′)c
) 1
1−2γ
.
n∗(a∗min) is a lower bound for deployment under regime one that will play a role in the welfare
comparison.
Appendix 3. The Second-Order Conditions under Regime One
The Hessian matrix of second derivatives of the profit function must be negative definite.
The matrix is
H =
 ∂2pii/∂n2i ∂2pii/∂ni∂pi
∂2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂p
2
i
 =
(eq)
 αa(γ − 1) α a2tγnγ−1
α
a
2t
γnγ−1 −1/t
 .
We obtainDet(H11) = αa(γ−1) < 0. FurthermoreDet(H) = αa(1−γ)nγ−2/t−α2a2γ2n2γ−2/4t2.
Using the fact that n∗(a) = (αa/2c)
1
1−γ we get Det(H) = 2c(1 − γ)/tn − c2γ2/t2. Clearly
Det(H) > 0 if γ = 0. Suppose γ > 0, Det(H) > 0 is equivalent to n∗(a) < 2(1− γ)t/cγ2 or
equivalently,
(40) a <
2c
α
(
2(1− γ)t
cγ2
)1−γ ≡ amax.
The latter condition is verified if a∗ < amax, where a∗ is the solution of (37). This last
inequality can be rewritten
(41) vb − cb < 3t
2
+
2(1− γ)t
γ2
− α
2
4(β − β′)(
2(1− γ)t
cγ2
)2γ.
One can verify that the RHS of expression (41) is decreasing with γ. When γ → 0, the RHS
of expression (41) is infinite. When γ = 1/2, the RHS is close to 11t/2 because assumption
2 guarantees that α
2
4c(β−β′) is small. Condition (41) must hold together with assumption 1.
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Appendix 4. Proof that f ∗i = a under regimes 2 and 3
Under regimes 2 and 3, bank i’s demand for deposits is Di = 1/2 + (1/2t)(vi− vj − pi + pj).
Hence
(42)
∂Di
∂pi
= − 1
2t
.
Let us calculate the effect of fi on Di. We have
(43)
∂Di
∂fi
=
1
2t
∂vi
∂fi
.
Using expression (2), we obtain
(44)
∂vi
∂fi
=
∂ui
∂qfi
∂qfi
∂fi
− qfi − (fi + sj)
∂qfi
∂fi
.
As ∂vi/∂q
f
i = 0, we have ∂ui/∂q
f
i = fi + sj so that ∂vi/∂fi = −qfi . Finally we obtain
(45)
∂Di
∂fi
= − 1
2t
qfi .
Condition (8)(ii) can be rewritten:
(46) p˜i = pi − cb − (a− fi)qfi − (a+ si)qfj = −Di/
∂Di
∂pi
= 2tDi.
Plugging this result into condition (8)(iii), we obtain
(47) 2tDi
∂Di
∂fi
+ (fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂fi
Di + q
f
i Di = 0.
Using expression (45), we have
(48) (fi − a)∂q
f
i
∂fi
Di = 0.
hence f ∗i = a for any Di. 
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Appendix 5. The Equilibrium Network Size under Regime Two
Using expressions (6) and (34), we have
(49)
∂Di
∂ni
=
1
2t
∂(vi − vj)
∂ni
=
α
2t
(fj
(
nγ−1 + (γ − 1)ninγ−2
)− fi(γ − 1)njnγ−2).
At the symmetric equilibrium we have fi = fj = a and ni = nj. Hence,
(50)
∂Di
∂ni
=
α
2t
anγ−1.
Using expressions (16) and (50), we can rewrite expression (18) as
(51)
α
2
anγ−1 +
α(1 + γ)
4
anγ−1 − c = 0,
which yields expression (19). 
Appendix 6. The Second-Order Conditions under Regime Two
Let us calculate the Hessian matrix at (n∗ff (a), p
∗
ff (a), f
∗ = a). We have
H =

∂2pii/∂n
2
i ∂
2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂ni∂fi
∂2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂p
2
i ∂
2pii/∂pi∂fi
∂2pii/∂ni∂fi ∂
2pii/∂fi∂pi ∂
2pii/∂f
2
i

or
H =

−A−B/t c/t cqf∗i,ff (a)/t
c/t −1/t −qf∗i,ff (a)/t
cqf∗i,ff (a)/t −qf∗i,ff (a)/t −β/2− qf∗i,ff (a)2/t

with A = c
n∗ff (a)
(1−γ)(γ+6)
3+γ
> 0 and B = 8c2 1+γ
(3+γ)2
> 0. A and B do not depend on t.
Det(H11) = −A−B/t is negative.
Det(H22) = (tA+B − c2)/t2 is positive for t sufficiently large.
Det(H) = −0.5β(tA+B − c2)/t2 is negative for t sufficiently large.
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Appendix 7. Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i). Let us compare n∗(a) and n∗ff (a). We have n
∗
ff (a) = λn
∗(a) with
(52) λ =
(
3 + γ
2
) 1
1−γ
(≥ 3
2
).
Hence n∗(a) > n∗ff (a). 
Part (ii). Let us compare p∗(a) and p∗ff (a). We can rewrite (10) as p
∗(a) = t+cb+αan∗γ(a).
Using the fact that a = 2cn∗1−γ(a)/α, we can write everything as a function of n∗(a):
p∗(a) = t + cb + 2cn∗(a). We can also rewrite (17) as p∗ff (a) = t + cb + a(αn
∗γ
ff (a)/2 − βa).
Using the fact that a = 4cn∗1−γff (a)/(α(3 + γ)), we obtain p
∗
ff (a) = t + cb + 2cn
∗
ff (a)/(3 +
γ) − 16βc2n∗2−2γff (a)/(α2(3 + γ)2). Hence using (52) and the fact that λγ < 2, p∗ff (a) <
t+ cb + 2cn
∗
ff (a)/(3 + γ) = t+ cb + λ
γcn∗(a) < t+ cb + 2cn∗(a) = p∗(a). 
Part (iii). Let us compare pi∗(a) and pi∗ff (a). We express everything in n
∗(a). We have
n∗ff (a) = λn
∗(a). Furthermore using (12) we have a = 2cn∗1−γ(a)/α. Hence,
(53) pi∗(a) = α
a
2
n∗γ(a)− c
2
n∗(a) =
c
2
n∗(a).
Furthermore,
pi∗ff (a) = α
a
2
n∗γff (a)− βa2 −
c
2
n∗ff (a) = α
a
2
λγn∗γ(a)− βa2 − c
2
λn∗(a)(54)
= (2λγ − λ) c
2
n∗(a)− βa2 =
(
3 + γ
2
) γ
1−γ
(
1− γ
2
)
c
2
n∗(a)− βa2.(55)
As
(
3+γ
2
) γ
1−γ
(
1−γ
2
)
< 2 ∗ 1
2
= 1, we have pi∗(a) > pi∗ff (a). 
Part (iv). Let us calculate the sign of w∗ff (a)− w∗(a):
(56) w∗ff (a)− w∗(a) =
(
α2n∗2γff (a)
4(β − β′) +
3β
2
a2 − αan∗γff (a)
)
−
(
α2n∗2γ(a)
4(β − β′) − αan
∗γ(a)
)
.
Note first that w∗ff (a) − w∗(a) > 0 for γ = 0. Let us take γ > 0. We express everything
in n∗(a). We have a = 2cn∗1−γ(a)/α. As before we can write n∗ff (a) = λn
∗(a) where λ is
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defined by (52). (56) becomes
w∗ff (a)− w∗(a) =
α2n∗2γ(a)
4(β − β′) (λ
2γ − 1) + 6βc
2n∗2−2γ(a)
α2
− 2(λγ − 1)cn∗(a)(57)
= n∗(a)
(
α2(λ2γ − 1)
4(β − β′) n
∗2γ−1(a) +
6βc2
α2
n∗1−2γ(a)− 2(λγ − 1)c
)
.(58)
We can use the fact that minX(A/X +BX) = 2
√
AB to verify that
min
n
(
α2n2γ−1
4(β − β′)(λ
2γ − 1) + 6βc
2n1−2γ
α2
− 2(λγ − 1)c
)
=(59) (√
6
β
β − β′ (λ
2γ − 1)−
√
4(λγ − 1)2
)
c.(60)
Expression (60) is positive because 6 β
β−β′ (λ
2γ − 1) > 6(λ2γ − 12) > 4(λγ − 1)2 for any λ > 1.
Hence w∗ff (a)− w∗(a) > 0 for any n∗(a) > 0, that is for any a > 0. 
Appendix 8. Consumer surplus under regime two. Comparison of a∗ and a∗ff .
Under regime two, the surplus of the indifferent consumer is
(61) w∗ff (a
∗
ff ) = vb − cb −
3t
2
+
(
α2
4(β − β′) −
29α2
512β
)
(n∗ff )
2γ > 0.
We know from appendix two that a∗ ≥ a∗min where a∗min is defined by expression (38). It is
easy to verify that a∗min > a
∗
ff where a
∗
ff is defined by (24). Hence a
∗ ≥ a∗ff . 
Appendix 9. Effect of ni on Bank i’s Deposit Market Share, under Regime Three
Using expressions (6) and (34), we have
(62)
∂Di
∂ni
=
1
2t
∂(vi − vj)
∂ni
=
α
2t
((si + fj)
(
nγ−1 + (γ − 1)ninγ−2
)− (sj + fi)(γ − 1)njnγ−2).
For fi = fj = a, ni = nj and si = sj = s we obtain
(63)
∂Di
∂ni
=
α
2t
(a+ s)nγ−1.
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Appendix 10. Effect of si on Bank i’s Deposit Market Share, under Regime Three
Using expressions (2) and (6) one can write
(64)
∂Di
∂si
= − 1
2t
∂vj
∂si
= − 1
2t
(
∂uj
∂qfj
∂qfj
∂si
− qfj − (fj + si)
∂qfj
∂si
).
However ∂uj/∂q
f
j = fj + si so that ∂vj/∂si = −qfj . Hence we have
(65)
∂Di
∂si
=
1
2t
qfj .
Appendix 11. The Second-Order Conditions under Regime Three
We show that the Hessian matrix at (n∗sur, p
∗
sur, f
∗, s∗) is negative definite when t is large
enough. We have
H =

∂2pii/∂n
2
i ∂
2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂ni∂fi ∂
2pii/∂ni∂si
∂2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂p
2
i ∂
2pii/∂pi∂fi ∂
2pii/∂pi∂si
∂2pii/∂ni∂fi ∂
2pii/∂fi∂pi ∂
2pii/∂f
2
i ∂
2pii/∂fi∂si
∂2pii/∂ni∂si ∂
2pii/∂pi∂si ∂
2pii∂fi∂si ∂
2pii/∂s
2
i

or
H =

−A−B/t c/t cD/t E/t+ F
c/t −1/t −D/t 0
cD/t −D/t −β/2−D2/t 0
E/t+ F 0 0 −3β/2 +D2/t

with A = c
n∗sur
(1−γ)(γ+6)
3+γ
> 0, B = 8c2 1+γ
(3+γ)2
> 0, D = α(n∗sur)
γ/6 > 0, E = α2 1−γ
72β
(n∗sur)
3γ−1 >
0 and F = αγ+1
2
(n∗sur)
γ−1 > 0
Det(H11) = −A−B/t < 0
Det(H22) = (tA+B − c2)/t2 is positive for t sufficiently large.
Det(H33) = −0.5β(tA+B − c2)/t2 is negative for t sufficiently large.
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Det(H44) = 0.25β [t
2(3Aβ − 2F 2)− 2AtD2 + 3Bβt− 2BD2 − 3c2βt+ 2c2D2 − 2E2 − 4EFt] /t3
is positive when t is large enough. Indeed γ <
√
129−9
6
' 0.393 guarantees that 3Aβ−2F 2 > 0.
Appendix 12: Proof of proposition 5
Part (i). Let us compare n∗(a∗) and n∗ff (a
∗
ff ). From appendix 2 we know that n
∗(a∗) ≥
n∗(a∗min). It is easy to verify that n
∗(a∗min) > n
∗
ff (a
∗
ff ). 
Part (ii). Let us compare p∗ff (a
∗
ff ) and p
∗
sur. Using (30), we have
(66) p∗sur = t+ cb + (a+ s
∗
i (a))q
f∗
j,sur(a) = t+ cb +
α2
18β
n∗2γsur .
Furthermore p∗ff (a
∗
ff ) = t+ cb + a(αn
∗γ
ff (a
∗
ff )/2− βa∗ff ). Using expression (25) and the fact
that a∗ff = 4cn
∗1−γ
ff (a
∗
ff )/(α(3 + γ)), we have
p∗ff (a
∗
ff ) = t+ cb +
2cn∗ff (a
∗
ff )
3 + γ
− 16βc
2n∗2−2γff (a
∗
ff )
α2(3 + γ)2
(67)
= t+ cb + n
∗2γ
ff (a
∗
ff )
[
2cn∗1−2γff
3 + γ
− 16βc
2n∗2−4γff (a
∗
ff )
α2(3 + γ)2
]
(68)
= t+ cb +
7α2
256β
n∗2γff (a
∗
ff ).(69)
Clearly p∗ff (a
∗
ff ) < p
∗
sur. 
Part (iii). Let us compare pi∗(a∗) and pi∗ff (a
∗
ff ). Let us consider particular values of the
parameters: v0b , c
0
b and t
0 that satisfy v0b−c0b−3t0/2 = 0. They yield the minimum interchange
fee a∗min that we obtained in appendix 2 (expression 38). According to expression (15), the
associated profit under regime one is
(70) pi∗(a∗min) =
t0
2
+
(
αa∗min
22−γcγ
) 1
1−γ
=
t0
2
+ 4
γ−2
1−2γα
2
1−2γ
(
1
β − β′
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
.
Let us consider parameters vb, cb and t such that vb − cb − 3t/2 ≥ 0. The corresponding
interchange fee a∗ is higher than a∗min. The associated profit is
(71) pi∗(a∗) =
t
2
+
(
αa∗
22−γcγ
) 1
1−γ
.
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Under regime two, according to expression (26), we have
(72) pi∗ff (a
∗
ff ) =
t
2
+ 4
2γ−4
1−2γ (1− 2γ) (3 + γ) 2γ1−2γ α 21−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
.
One can verify that
(73) 4
γ−2
1−2γα
2
1−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
> 4
2γ−4
1−2γ (1− 2γ) (3 + γ) 2γ1−2γ α 21−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
.
Hence,
pi∗(a∗) =
t
2
+
(
αa∗
22−γcγ
) 1
1−γ
(74)
>
t
2
+
(
αa∗min
22−γcγ
) 1
1−γ
=
t
2
+ 4
γ−2
1−2γα
2
1−2γ
(
1
β − β′
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
(75)
>
t
2
+ 4
2γ−4
1−2γ (1− 2γ) (3 + γ) 2γ1−2γ α 21−2γ
(
1
β
) 1
1−2γ
(
1
c
) 2γ
1−2γ
= pi∗ff (a
∗
ff ).(76)

Part (iv). We compare the surplus of the indifferent consumer under regimes 2 et 3. We
have
(77) w˜∗ff (a
∗
ff ) = vb − cb −
3t
2
+
(
α2
4(β − β′) −
29α2
512β
)
(n∗ff )
2γ,
and
(78) w˜∗sur = vb − cb −
3t
2
+
(
α2
4(β − β′) −
α2
6β
)
(n∗sur)
2γ.
As n∗sur = (
16
3
)
1
1−2γn∗ff (a
∗
ff ), writing w
∗
ff (a
∗
ff ) > w
∗
sur yields γ < γ(β
′/β). 
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Notes
1Banks also pay the network a switch fee per foreign transaction and an annual membership fee to cover
its costs. See McAndrews [2003].
2In Great Britain in 1999, consumer protests over an attempt by several banks to introduce surcharges
were so strong that the banks have not only abandoned their surcharge plans but also eliminated existing
foreign fees.
3After growing at an annual rate of 9.2% from 1991 to 1996, the number of ATM’s per million inhabitants
increased at an annual rate of 16.7% between 1996 and 2001, and 3.3% between 2001 and 2006. This made
this number grow from 331 in 1991 to 524 in 1996, 1136 in 2001 and 1335 in 2006 (source: Bank for
International Settlements - statistics on payment and settlement systems in selected countries).
4In 2006 in the U.S.A., there are 1335 ATM’s per million inhabitants and in Canada, 1630 ATM’s per
million inhabitants. In both countries, cardholders pay foreign fees and surcharges. These figures have to be
compared with the 968 ATM’s per million inhabitants in the United Kingdom or the 761 ATM’s per million
inhabitants in France. In both countries, banks do not usually charge ATM usage (source: ibid)
5In the U.S.A., the monthly transactions per ATM declined from 6400 in 1996 to 3500 in 2001, and 2130
in 2006 (source: American Bankers Association, ATM fact sheet, 2007].
6In 2006, according to Dove consulting [2006 ATM deployer study), deployers earned an average of $1,104
per month at their on-premise ATM’s, and $1,013 at their off-premise ATM’s. On the spending side, deployers
incurred average monthly expenses of $1,444 per on-premise ATM, and $1,450 per off-premise ATM.
7This cost includes the purchase costs of the machine (depreciated over its lifetime), installation, site
rental, maintenance, communications, cash replenishment and the opportunity cost of the cash.
8The upper bound on γ is needed for the second order conditions of the profit maximization.
9See Donze & Dubec [2006] for an example of derivation of such equilibria above a∗ with less general
demands for withdrawals.
10The empirical literature (eg Knittel and Stango [2008] or Ishii [2006]) talks of ‘the incompatibility effect’
42
of ATM usage fees, and more particularly of surcharges.
11Note that the effect of introducing foreign fees on the demand for foreign withdrawals (and hence on
revenues) is ambiguous since more ATM’s are available at a higher usage fee.
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Figure 1: determination of a∗
44
Figure 2: comparison of consumers’ welfare under regime two and regime three
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